Established relationships with a borrower is one of the primary channels through which lenders reduce agency problems and information asymmetry in debt contracting. Given the critical role individual managers play in shaping corporate policies and performance, we investigate the importance of lenders' relationships with individual managers and their impact on lending practices. Utilizing a setting of executive turnovers, we find that a lender is 1.6 times more likely to start a lending relationship with a firm when a manager with whom it has a prior lending relationship is hired by the firm as a top executive. We also find that the likelihood of a lender's co-migration with a manager is higher when the firm is more opaque, consistent with the higher importance of prior relationships in poor information environments. We next show that comigration benefits the borrowing firm through greater access to credit and a lower cost of financing. Further, a stronger lender-manager relationship increases the likelihood of a lender's co-migration with the manager, especially when the lender is under pressure to expand her lending portfolio and seek new borrowers. Overall, our paper provides novel evidence on the importance of lender-manager relationships in credit markets.
Introduction
Economic theories suggest that market frictions such as information asymmetry and agency costs can hinder the allocation of capital to positive NPV projects (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) .
By ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring of a borrower, banks reduce information asymmetry and allow for the efficient allocation of capital to these projects (Diamond, 1984, and Fama, 1985) .
One of the primary channels through which lenders reduce agency problems is by forging a relationship with their borrowers. By developing a strong relationship through repeated transactions and continuous interaction with the borrowing firm, lenders are able to gather relevant information not only about the borrowing firm's prospects, but also about the competence and trustworthiness of its management (e.g., Rajan, 1992, and Schenone, 2010) . 1 However, prior studies that examine relationship lending focus primarily on the relationship between lenders and the borrowing firm, without addressing the role played by the relationship between lenders and individual managers (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000 , Bharath et al., 2011 , Santos and Winton, 2009 , and Schenone, 2010 . In this paper, we investigate the importance of the lender-manager relationship and its impact on lending practices.
Individual managers play an important role in shaping corporate behavior and performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, and Hambrick, 2007) . A manager's characteristics and style significantly affect a variety of firm practices and policies, including investment and financial strategies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) , disclosure and communication choices (Bamber, Jiang and Wang, 2010 , Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2011 , DeJong and Ling, 2013 and the extent of tax aggressiveness (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2010) . Prior research also documents that uncertainty about manager-specific characteristics increases investors' assessment of a firm's riskiness and increases its cost of debt (e.g., Pan et al., 2015a and 2015b) . Institutional evidence also suggests that credit rating agencies and loan officers consider a manager's "character" as one of the key factors in assessing a firm's credit risk (Plath et al., 2008, and Koch and MacDonald, 2014) . Because, through prior interactions with a manager, lenders can assess her talent, honesty, strategic vision, motivation and risk attitude, we expect the lender-manager relationship to reduce lenders' information asymmetry about a borrowing firm's creditworthiness and future performance and thus significantly affect lending practices.
As our primary focus in this paper is lenders' relationship with a manager, the key empirical design challenge we face is how to disentangle this relationship from the one between lenders and the borrowing firm. To accurately identify the lender-manager relationship and its consequences on lending practices, we utilize a setting of executive turnover. Specifically, we examine how the relationship a lender develops with a manager at the company the manager leaves (origin firm) affects its lending to the company that the manager joins (destination firm). We identify 648 origindestination firm pairs that experience CEO or CFO turnover over the 1992-2014 period. To accurately assess the effects of the lender-manager relationship, we also construct a matched sample of pseudo origin-destination firm pairs (Brochet et al., 2014) . We analyze these firms' syndicated lending and thus focus on the lead arrangers of syndication, which take on the primary information collection and monitoring responsibilities.
2 Based on this empirical setting, we investigate three broad research questions: 1) do an origin firm's lead arrangers follow the manager to the destination firm (i.e., co-migrate with the manager)? 2) what factors increase the likelihood of co-migration? and 3) are there benefits to co-migration for the destination firm?
We expect that lenders' established relationship with a manager will decrease their uncertainty about the destination firm's risk taking, investment strategies and future financial performance, thus reducing the risks involved in providing it credit funding. In addition, because managers often provide private lenders with important non-public information about their financial position (e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, Standard and Poor's, 2007) , lender-manager relationship will enhance the reliability of such information and thus reduce lenders' efforts to verify its quality and accuracy. We therefore predict that lenders will have incentives to continue utilizing their valuable relationships with the manager and will be likely to co-migrate with the manager to the destination firm. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. A lead arranger is 1.6 times more likely to start a lending relationship with a firm when a manager with whom it has a prior lending relationship moves to the firm as a top executive. This finding emphasizes that lenders create important relationships with the managers of a borrowing firm.
We supplement this analysis by testing whether the probability of a lead arranger comigration with the manager is higher for more informationally opaque borrowers. Lending to opaque borrowers is associated with substantial agency costs and costly monitoring (e.g., Diamond, 1991 , Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Berger and Udell, 1995 , suggesting that the lenders' relationship with a manager should be particularly valuable when the destination firm operates in a poor information environment. We consider a destination firm to be more informationally opaque when it is smaller (e.g., Bharath et al., 2007, and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008) , not rated by credit rating agencies (e.g., Sufi, 2007, and Kraft, 2014) or when it has low analyst coverage (Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2010) . Across all information opaqueness measures, we find that the likelihood of co-migration is significantly higher when the destination firm is more opaque.
We next investigate whether the lenders' co-migration benefits the destination firm. Building on the prior relationship lending literature that documents that borrowers with close ties to lenders have greater availability of credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, and Rajan and Zingales, 1998) , we predict that lender co-migration endows the destination firms with higher access to debt capital.
We assess our prediction in two ways. First, we examine whether a lender is more likely to comigrate with the manager when a destination firm has limited access to capital, which would suggest that co-migration at least partially alleviates the firm's capital constraints. Using the number of the destination firm's prior lead arranger relationships as a measure of its access to credit (e.g., Houston and James, 1996, and Murfin, 2012) , we find that the probability of comigration is significantly higher for firms with weak access. We supplement this evidence by examining whether the probability of co-migration is higher when the lending standards in credit markets are tight. Using changes in bank lending standards, as reported by the Federal Reserve
Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (e.g., Bassett et al., 2012) , we find that lead arrangers are more likely to co-migrate with a manager when credit standards are tight and firms in the economy face greater credit constraints.
Second, we perform a more direct test of credit availability by examining whether comigration increases the extent of the destination firm's syndicated loan financing. For the sample of firms that experience executive turnover, we find that a lead arranger's co-migration is associated with an 18 percent higher syndicated loan borrowing for destination firms following turnover relative to destination firms that do not experience lender co-migration. Overall, our findings suggest that managers' relationships with lenders benefit borrowers by enabling greater access to credit.
We extend these analyses by exploring whether co-migration also has a favorable effect on the cost of debt. It is possible that through their relationship with the manager, lenders will share potential cost savings due to reduced information asymmetry with the destination firms. However, prior literature provides mixed evidence with respect to whether relationship lending decreases the cost of borrowing, sometimes even finding an increase in these costs due to the hold-up problem in relationship lending (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000 , Santos and Winton, 2009 , and Schenone, 2010 . We find that the destination firms' cost of borrowing is, on average, 21.7 basis points lower when lenders co-migrate with managers, which represents 11.8 percent of the average interest spread for the sample destination firms.
Although our analyses so far focus on borrowers' characteristics and financing needs, in our last set of tests we examine what factors affect a lender's decision to co-migrate with a manager.
We predict that the strength of the lender-manager relationship increases the probability of comigration. Because a stronger lender-manager relationship is likely to be associated with lenders' greater trust in the manager's integrity, talent and information that she provides, it should therefore lead to a higher reduction in information asymmetry about the borrowing firm. We perform lender level analyses for a sample of all lead arrangers that had syndicated loans to the origin firm over a manager's tenure. We designate lead arrangers that syndicated more than 75 percent of all loans to the origin firm as having a strong lending relationship with the manager. We find that these lead arrangers are 3.4 times more likely to follow a manager to the destination firm relative to other lead arrangers of the origin firm.
We add to this analysis by examining whether the strength of the lender-manager relationship has a more significant effect on the co-migration probability when lenders are under pressure to expand their loan portfolio and seek new borrowers. We show that when lead arrangers with a strong relationship with a manager experience relatively low loan growth, they are more likely to expand their lending portfolio by extending credit to the destination firm. We also find that the strength of the lending relationship has a higher impact on the probability of co-migration when a lead arranger experiences low profitability, consistent with new lending relationships having the potential to increase a lender's future profitability via additional interest revenues, loan origination fees or fees from other services provided to the destination firm.
Our paper contributes to the literature across several dimensions. First, we add to the literature on relationship lending. Prior studies have documented that the relationship between lenders and a borrowing firm plays a critical role in reducing information asymmetry and agency problems in private lending (e.g., Rajan, 2002 , Berger and Udell, 1995 , Bharath et al., 2011 , Santos and Winton, 2009 , and Schenone, 2010 . Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) , Boot and Thakor (1994) , Berger and Udell (1995) and Bharath et al. (2011) , among others, also demonstrate the benefits to borrowers of an established lending relationship. We extend these studies by showing that lenders establish a valuable relationship not only with the borrowing firm, but also with its managers. We also document that lender-manager relationships benefit the firm the manager joins via enhanced access to credit and lower cost of debt financing.
Our findings also add to the emerging literature on the role of relationships in capital markets in general, and in bank lending in particular. Engleberg et al. (2012) show that firms benefit from lower interest spreads on their loans when firm and bank executives attended the same college or previously worked together. Haselmann et al. (2013) report that German banks provide significantly more credit to firms whose executives belong to the same social club as the bank's executives. Karolyi (2014) reports that following executive turnover, borrowers lose as much as 74% of the benefits from lenders with personal relationships with the former executive and therefore tend to borrow from new lenders. We supplement these studies by documenting that personal relationships between executives and lenders survive managerial turnover and carry over to the firm the manager joins. We also show that a borrower's information opacity and capital needs influence the likelihood of lender co-migration.
Third, our study is also relevant to the literature on the impact of personal networks and relationships on business and investment decisions. Brochet et al. (2014) find that executive turnover triggers analysts following the company that the manager leaves to initiate coverage of the company the executive joins. Cohen et al. (2008) show that personal relationships influence the flow of information into asset prices. They find that mutual fund managers are more likely to place larger bets on firms run by managers who graduated from the same institution and that this practice allows them to earn higher average returns on their investments. Fracassi (2014) and Schmidt (2015) show that social networks influence capital investments and mergers and acquisition outcomes, respectively. We add to these studies by documenting that lenders' personal relationship with a manager significantly affects their decision to initiate a lending relationship with the new firm. We also show that the strength of the lender's prior relationship with a manager increases the probability that the lender provides credit to the new firm the manager joins.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and empirical design. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature and Hypotheses Development

Manager and Lender Co-Migration
Prior literature has extensively examined the importance of relationship lending.
Relationship lenders have deep knowledge of a borrower's operations and well developed channels of communication with the borrower's managers (e.g., Rajan, 1992 , Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Bharath et al., 2007 , and Schenone, 2010 . Prior studies also suggest that borrowers are inclined to reveal more information to lenders with whom they have an established lending relationship and that relationship lenders have stronger incentives to invest in information production (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995 , Boot, 2000 , and Bharath et al., 2008 . Relationship lenders thus play an important role in reducing the agency problems associated with debt financing. There is also ample evidence that relationship lending has important consequences for lending practices, such as a higher availability of credit to borrowers with a strong relationship with their lenders (e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1990a , 1990b , and Petersen and Rajan, 1994 .
For the most part, previous studies focus on the relationship at the institutional level between lenders and the borrowing firm (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000 , Bharath et al., 2011 , Santos and Winton, 2009 , and Schenone, 2010 . For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) focus on lenders' relationship with small firms, for which data is available under the National Survey of Small Business Finances. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) examine relationship lending in the context of small businesses in Belgium. Bharath et al. (2011) , Santos and Winton (2009) and Schenone (2010) utilize the relationship between lenders and borrowing firms in the syndicated loan market.
However, individual managers play a crucial role in shaping firm strategies and performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, and Hambrick, 2007) . Manager characteristics, such as confidence, risk attitude, intrinsic motivation and underlying talent are often collectively referred to as "management style." Prior research documents that management style impacts a wide spectrum of organizational outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) report that management style explains a significant amount of the heterogeneity in the investment, financial and organizational practices of firms. The individual-specific characteristics of managers have also been shown to affect other firm policies and practices, such as tax avoidance strategies (Dyreng et al., 2010) , accounting choices (Ge et al., 2011, and DeJong and Ling, 2013) and voluntary financial disclosure policies (Bamber et al., 2010) . We therefore explore whether lenders' relationships with individual managers significantly affect lending practices.
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The lender-manager relationship is likely to reduce lenders' uncertainty about the manager's underlying talent, personality, risk attitude and strategic vision, consequently reducing the risks involved in funding the borrowing firm. Pan et al. (2015a) report that a firm's stock return volatility increases significantly around CEO turnover and then declines over the tenure of the CEO. They interpret this finding as suggesting that over time, the market learns about a CEO's individualspecific characteristics and that this reduction in uncertainty results in a decline in a firm's riskiness. Similarly, Pan et al. (2015b) show that uncertainty about a firm's management also affects the cost of borrowing. They find that a firm's CDS spreads, loan spreads and bond yield spreads decline over the first three years of CEO tenure, holding other macroeconomic, firm and security level factors constant. Further, evidence from practice also highlights the importance of manager "character" in credit decisions. Koch and MacDonald (2014) report that it is standard practice for banks to assess managers' abilities and talents when evaluating credit requests. Credit rating agencies also carefully analyze a manager's impact on firm value when evaluating a firm's credit riskiness (e.g., Plath et al., 2008) .
We expect the lender-manager relationship to be particularly important when lenders extend credit to a new borrower, as adverse selection problems are the most severe in this case. Therefore, to explore the effects of the lender-manager relationship on lending practices, we utilize an empirical setting where a lender extends credit to a new borrower whose manager has an established relationship with the lender. Specifically, we focus on a sample of firms that experience executive turnover, where a lender has developed a relationship with a manager at the company the manager leaves (origin firm) and may start a lending relationship with the new company a manager joins (destination firm). Through prior transactions with the manager at the origin firm, the lender has had an opportunity to assess her talent, trustworthiness, strategic vision, motivation and risk taking behavior. This assessment will help the lender to decrease its uncertainty about the destination firm's investment and financial policies, future strategies and financial performance, thus allowing a more accurate evaluation of its credit risk. In addition, because in private lending managers often provide lenders with confidential information about their financial position and projections (e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, Standard and Poor's, 2007) , prior lender-manager relationship will enhance the reliability of such information. This in turn will decrease the efforts lenders need to exert to verify the quality and accuracy of this non-public information and will further enhance lenders' ability to correctly asses the risks involved in funding the borrower.
We therefore predict that lenders will have incentives to continue utilizing their valuable information about the manager and well established channels of communication with her and will be likely to follow the manager to the destination firm. Because we conduct our analyses in the syndicated loan market setting, we focus our hypotheses on the lead arrangers of the syndication.
Lead arrangers establish a relationship with the borrower, negotiate the terms of the loan contract, perform the primary screening and monitoring of the borrower, and recruit participants to join the syndicate (e.g., Sufi, 2007) . Accordingly, our first research hypothesis is as follows:
H1 -A lead arranger is more likely to start a lending relationship with a firm when a
manager with whom it has a prior relationship moves as a top executive in this firm.
The Effect of a Borrower's Information Opacity on the Probability of a Lender's Co-Migration with the Manager
We expect the lender-manager relationship to be especially valuable in lending to informationally opaque borrowers. These borrowers rely primarily on relationship lending because information asymmetry about their performance and creditworthiness deters prospective lenders from extending them credit (e.g., Diamond, 1991 , Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , and Berger and Udell, 1995 . Providing credit to informationally opaque borrowers requires lenders to exert substantial screening and monitoring efforts. Further, assessing the reliability and accuracy of nonpublic information provided by managers at loan initiation and within the course of the loan is particularly important in lending transactions with these borrowers (Bharath et al, 2007 and Bushman et al., 2010) . In the syndicated loan market, loans to non-transparent borrowers are also more costly for the lead arranger to syndicate as the arranger has to commit to holding a larger proportion of the loans to attract syndicate participants (e.g., Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 2009 ). Thus, when extending credit to borrowers that operate in a poor information environment, having an established relationship with a manager should endow lenders with meaningful cost savings.
From the borrower's perspective, opaque borrowers are also more likely to seek financing from lenders that have established relationships with the new manager. Information asymmetry increases loan pricing and has a detrimental effect on other contractual terms, such as maturity and collateral requirements (e.g., Francis et al., 2005 , Zhang, 2007 , Bharath et al., 2008 , and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011 . Therefore, non-transparent borrowers are likely to benefit from more lenient loan terms when information asymmetry is mitigated due to lender-manager relationships. Combined, lender-and borrower-based arguments lead to our second hypothesis:
H2 -The likelihood of the lead arranger's co-migration with a manager is higher when the
destination firm is more informationally opaque.
The Consequences of Lender-Manager Co-Migration: Benefits to the Destination Firm
Prior literature on relationship lending documents that a borrower's close ties with its lenders allow for greater access to credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, and Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Petersen and Rajan (1995) extend this evidence and show that relationship lending is especially beneficial to young, more credit rationed firms. Bolton et al. (2013) further highlight that relationship lending is valuable when firms have limited access to credit. They show that banks endowed their borrowers with higher credit availability during the recent financial crisis, although they charge higher interest spreads in normal times.
We extend these arguments to the lender-manager relationship setting and predict that when the lender co-migrates with the manager, the destination firm benefits from higher access to debt capital. However, empirically assessing the change in credit availability to the borrower is always challenging. Therefore, we assess our prediction in two ways. First, we examine whether a lender is more likely to co-migrate with the manager when the destination firm has more limited access to debt capital, thus relieving, at least partially, its capital constraints. Our third hypothesis is thus stated as following:
H3a -The likelihood of the lead arranger's co-migration with a manager is higher when the destination firm is more capital constrained.
Second, we examine the association between a lender's co-migration and the extent of the destination firm's syndicated loan borrowing following an executive turnover. Stated as a formal hypothesis:
H3b -The extent of a destination firm's syndicated loan financing following executive turnover is higher when a lead arranger co-migrates with a manager relative to when the lead arranger does not follow the manager to the destination firm.
The benefits of lender-manager relationship can also extend to less expensive credit. Lenders may pass on some of the potential cost savings due to the reduced information asymmetry from its established relationship with a manager to the destination firm. If this is the case, a lender's comigration is likely to be associated with a lower interest spread. However, prior literature provides mixed evidence with respect to whether relationship lending results in cheaper credit. Berger and Udell (1995) show that borrowers with longer lending relationships experience lower credit costs than do borrowers with shorter relationships. Similarly, Bharath et al. (2011) show that repeated borrowing from the same lender results in lower spreads. In contrast, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find that interest rates increase with the length of the lending relationship, implying that relationship banks exploit their information advantage. Consistent with the hold-up problem associated with relationship lending (Rajan, 1992) , Santos and Winton (2009) find that bankdependent borrowers pay higher spreads during a recession. Similarly, Schenone (2010) shows that relationship loans become more expensive at high levels of relationship lending intensity.
Despite this conflicting prior evidence, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H4 -The cost of borrowing following executive turnover is lower for destination firms that experience a lead arranger's co-migration with the manager relative to destination firms where a lead arranger does not follow the manager.
The Importance of the Strength of the Lender-Manager Relationship in Determining Lenders'
Co-Migration
Next, we focus on a lender's incentives to co-migrate. We have assumed so far that all relationships are equal; however, the strength of the lender-manager relationship can be an important determinant of co-migration. Specifically, we expect a stronger lender-manager relationship to be associated with the lender placing greater trust in a manager's integrity, talent and information that she provides. Consequently, this stronger relationship is likely to reduce information asymmetry about the future performance and creditworthiness of the destination firm to a greater extent. Building on these arguments, we state our next hypothesis:
H5a -The likelihood of the lead arranger's co-migration with a manager to the destination firm increases with the strength of the lender-manager relationship.
Although we predict that a strong relationship between the lender and the manager should substantially reduce information asymmetry about the destination firm, adverse selection still remains a significant concern when lenders extend credit to new borrowers. We therefore expect the strength of the lender-manager relationship to have a more significant effect on the comigration probability when lenders are under pressure to expand their loan portfolio and thus seek new borrowers. Lenders are more likely to extend their borrowing base when they experience slow loan growth. Low profitability may also incentivize lenders to follow the manager to the destination firm. New lending relationships can increase lenders profitability via additional interest revenues and loan origination fees. Establishing a lending relationship with the destination firm may also help a lender gain future underwriting of its public bonds and equity (e.g., Drucker and Puri, 2005 , Yasuda, 2005 , and Brarath, 2007 , thus increasing fee revenues. To reflect these arguments, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H5b -The strength of the lead-arranger-manager relationship has a stronger effect on the co-migration probability when a lead arranger experiences lower loan growth or lower profitability relative to other lenders.
Sample Selection and Matching Procedure
Sample Selection
Because our study explores the co-migration of managers and lenders, we start our sample selection process by identifying executives that switch companies. We collect executive turnovers from the Execucomp database for the period from 1992 to 2014. We next search the names of the executives joining and leaving Execucomp firms in the BoardEx database to construct their comprehensive employment history. For each manager switching firms, we identify her origin and destination firms. We require a manager to hold a senior executive position for a period of at least three years in each firm. We focus on the turnovers of CEOs and CFOs because a firm's top management designs its policies and strategic goals and thus significantly affects its performance and creditworthiness.
Specifically, we identify executives that held the position of a CEO or CFO at the origin firm and migrated to the destination firm as a CEO or a CFO. As reported in Panel A of Table 1, we are able to identify 723 instances of CEOs' or CFOs' migrations in Execucomp over our sample period. We next obtain firm characteristics from Compustat and syndicated loan data from DealScan. We require each origin and destination firm to have at least one syndicated loan during the executive's tenure at each firm. We also require that sample firms have sufficient data for our analyses. These requirements reduce our sample to 648 executive turnovers.
In Panel B of Table 1 , we present the comparison of origin and destination firms across a number of characteristics, including size, profitability and leverage. Origin Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets of the origin firm. Origin Firm Profitability is the ratio of the origin firm's net income before extraordinary items to total assets. Origin Firm Leverage is the ratio of the origin firm's long-term debt to total assets. Destination Firm Size, Destination Firm Profitability and Destination Firm Leverage are defined analogously. All firm characteristics are measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover. We find that origin firms are on average, larger, have higher leverage and are more profitable than destination firms. These differences between the origin and destination firms' characteristics are statistically significant, although the difference between the two set of firms' leverage is only significant at the 10% level.
Control Sample
To accurately assess the effects of lenders' co-migration with the manager to the destination firm, we construct a control sample of origin-destination firm pairs. The matched pairs are created to mirror the treatment origin-destination firm pairs that experience executive turnover. Our matching procedure follows Brochet et al. (2014) and employs the Propensity Score Methodology (PSM), as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . Specifically, we estimate a propensity score for the origin as well as the destination firm and identify a matched pair of origin-destination firms. To do so, we estimate the following Logit Model:
As described in Figure 1 , the matching procedure involves a three step process. In the first step (i.e., Step 1 in Figure 1) , we pair the origin firm with all firms in the destination firm's twodigit SIC group and estimate Equation (1). The dependent variable, Turnover, equals one when the executive's origin firm is paired with its actual destination firm, zero otherwise. Therefore, in this step, Equation (1) is modeling the executive's decision to migrate from the origin to a particular destination firm. Next, we use the estimated coefficients to find a matched "pseudo" destination firm with the closest propensity score to the actual destination firm.
In
Step 2, we re-estimate Equation (1) for a sample consisting of the executive's actual destination firm paired with all firms in its origin firm's two-digit SIC group. For this sample, the dependent variable, Turnover, equals one if the executive's destination firm is paired with its actual origin firm, zero otherwise. In this step, Equation (1) is modeling a destination firm's decision to hire an executive from a certain origin firm. Next, as in Step 1, we use the estimated coefficients to find a matched "pseudo" origin firm with the closest propensity score to the actual origin firm.
Step 3, the matched pseudo origin and pseudo destination firms from Steps 1 and 2, respectively, are paired together for each actual origin-destination firm pair to create a matched control pair. Essentially, using propensity score matching we are able to identify matched origindestination control firm pairs that are similar to the actual origin-destination firm pairs across a variety of firm characteristics.
We perform the matching based on the following origin and destination firm characteristics. arrangers that syndicated loans to the destination firm during the three years prior to the executive's appointment. Finally, we address the possibility that the same lead arrangers may be syndicating loans to both the origin and destination firms prior to the executive's turnover. Bank Overlap is an indicator variable that equals one if at least one lead arranger lending to the origin firm during the executive's tenure also syndicated loans to the destination firm during the three years prior to the executive's appointment to the destination firm, zero otherwise. We measure our lead arranger lending-based variables for the destination firm over the three-year period prior to the executive's turnover. However, our primary findings do not change if we extend this estimation period to five years. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.
Origin Firm
Based on our three step matching procedure, we identify 648 control firm pairs for our CEO/CFO turnover sample. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the comparison between the turnover and propensity-score-based matched samples. The differences in variable means between these samples are insignificant for all variables, except for Bank Overlap, which is significant at the 10% level. This evidence mitigates the concern that origin and destination firm-specific characteristics may affect our findings.
Empirical Analyses
Test of Co-Migration
We begin our analysis by investigating the determinants of the co-migration of lenders and managers between origin and destination firms using the following logistic regression -
Migrate is an indicator variable that equals one if at least one lead arranger that syndicated loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure starts syndicating loans to the destination firm within three years of the executive's appointment, zero otherwise. We consider the lead arranger as initiating a lending relationship with the destination firm if it did not arrange its syndicated loans over the three-year period prior to the executive's appointment at the destination firm. We obtain similar results if we require the lead arranger to not have a lending relationship with the destination firm over the five years prior to the executive's appointment. Executive Turnover is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO or CFO of the origin firm migrates as a CEO or CFO to the destination firm, zero otherwise (i.e., Executive Turnover equals one for the actual origin-destination firm pairs and zero for the pseudo pairs).
We expect that lenders are more likely to migrate with a manager if the origin and destination firms are more similar. Therefore, we control for differences in size, profitability and leverage between the origin and destination firms. We measure Size Difference as the difference between We also control for the number of the origin firm's lead arrangers during the executive's tenure (Banks Lending to Origin Firm), as a larger number of lead arrangers with established relationships with an executive should be associated with a higher probability of at least one of them migrating to the destination firm. In contrast, a greater number of lead arrangers with established relationships with the destination firm (Banks Lending to Destination Firm) is likely to increase competition on syndicating its loans (Rajan, 1992) , thus decreasing the likelihood of the origin firm lead arrangers' migrating with the executive. We also account for the possibility that lead arrangers lending to the origin firms have a lending relationship with the destination firm We present our findings about the determinants of the co-migration of managers and lenders in Table 3 . We find a significant and positive coefficient on Executive Turnover, consistent with our predictions that lenders are likely to follow a manager to the destination firm. The coefficient of 0.451 on the Executive Turnover variable indicates that a lender is 1.6 times more likely to start a lending relationship with a firm when a manager with whom it has a prior lending relationship moves to the firm. The evidence of lender-manager co-migration suggests that personal relationships between lenders and managers survive and carry over to the new firm following managerial turnover.
In terms of control variables, as expected, we find a significant and positive coefficient on the Banks Lending to Origin Firm variable. Bank Overlap also significantly increases the probability of co-migration. This result is intuitive as the overlap in lead arrangers between the origin and destination firms suggests that these borrowers are likely to have similar credit profiles, increasing the probability that the origin firm's lenders consider the destination firm to be an attractive borrower.
We supplement these tests with untabulated analyses using a sample of firms that experience turnover of non-CEO-CFO top officers who are disclosed in SEC filings as senior executives (e.g., Chief Risk Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Executive Vice President, Corporate Marketing and Communications, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, or Executive Vice President, Administration).
4 Although relative to CEOs and CFOs these executives play a lesser role in establishing a firm's policies and strategies, lenders' familiarity with their managerial style and trust in their integrity may increase the likelihood of the lenders initiating lending relationships with the destination firm. We identify 2,008 non-CEO-CFO executive moves and follow the same procedure as with the CEO-CFO sample to create a control sample of origin-destination firm pairs.
We re-estimate Model 2 for the non-CEO-CFO sample and continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on the Turnover variable. This evidence further supports our hypothesis that lenders' prior relationship with the origin firm's top executives reduces information asymmetry about the destination firm, increasing the probability that they will provide debt capital to the destination firm.
Co-Migration and the Destination Firm's Information Opacity
We next turn to testing and exploring cross-sectional differences in lender-manager comigration. As discussed in Section 2, we expect the likelihood of co-migration to be higher when the destination firm is characterized by a poor information environment. We examine three different proxies for the destination firm's information environment. First, consistent with prior research, we consider smaller firms to be more informationally opaque (e.g., Bharath et al., 2007, and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008) . We assign a borrower to the small (large) firm subsample if its long-term assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover, are below (above) the sample median. Because credit rating agencies provide assessments of a borrower's creditworthiness that are valuable to lenders (e.g., Sufi, 2007, and Kraft, 2014) , the second proxy we use for a firm's information environment is whether the firm is rated by a credit rating agency. We obtain information on the credit ratings of the sample borrowers from the S&P and Moody's historical credit ratings databases. We assign a borrower to the nonrated subsample if it is not rated by either S&P or Moody's when a firm experiences the executive's turnover. Otherwise, the borrower is included in the rated subsample. We further assess a borrower's information environment by the extent of its equity analysts' coverage (Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2010) . We obtain analysts' coverage data from the I/B/E/S database. We assign a borrower to the low (high) analyst coverage subsample if the number of analysts covering the firm in the year preceding the year of the manager's move to the destination firm is below (above) the sample median.
We report the results of these analyses in Table 4 . As evidenced from Panel A, while the coefficient on Executive Turnover is not statistically significant for the larger firm partition, a lead arranger is 1.95 times more likely to start a lending relationship with a smaller borrower when a manager with whom it has a prior lending relationship moves to this firm. The magnitude of the Executive Turnover coefficient is also significantly larger for the small size partition (the difference in coefficients on Executive Turnover across partitions is significant at the 10% level).
For non-rated borrowers, when an executive moves to the destination firm, the probability that one of the origin firm's lenders will start lending to the destination firm is higher by 2.3 times relative to control firms. The effect of executive turnover is not significant for the rated partition, with the difference in the coefficients on Executive Turnover between the two partitions being highly significant. These findings are in line with Bharath (2007) findings that small and non-rated borrowers are significantly more likely to use their relationship banks for future loans.
We obtain similar results for our last information opacity measure. Relative to more transparent borrowers, when a borrower has low analyst coverage, lenders are significantly more likely to co-migrate. For the low analyst coverage partition, the probability that one of the origin firm's lenders starts lending to the destination firm is 2.0 times higher when a manager with whom it has a prior lending relationship moves to the firm. Overall, the results in Table 4 provide strong support for our prediction that the occurrence of co-migration substantially increases when the destination firm is more informationally opaque.
Benefits of Co-Migration to the Destination Firm
In this section, we investigate the benefits of co-migration to destination firms. An important potential benefit to destination firms of hiring a manager with an established lender relationship is access to financing through the relationship lender. We expect this access to relieve the capital constraints that a destination firm may be facing. We investigate this conjecture by two sets of tests. We start by examining whether the probability of co-migration is associated with a destination firm's access to debt capital. We predict that the likelihood of co-migration is higher when the destination firm has limited access to capital. Next, we perform more direct analyses of the benefits of co-migration by examining co-migration's effects on the destination firm's amount of syndicated borrowing and its pricing.
Co-migration and access to debt capital
We employ two proxies for the destination firm's access to debt capital. First, we assume that a higher number of lead arrangers syndicating the destination firm's loans (Banks Lending to Destination Firm) indicates its better access to syndicated loan financing (Houston and James, 1996, and Murfin, 2012) . We assign the destination firm to the weak access to credit category if it had no lending relationships in the syndicated loan market in the three years prior to the executive turnover. Otherwise, the destination firm is assigned to the strong access to credit category. In untabulated analyses, we assign destination firms to the access to credit categories based on the median number of lead arrangers and find similar results. Second, we assess the strength of the destination firm's access to debt capital based on the overall state of the debt markets. We assume that the destination firm's access to credit is weaker when the overall lending standards in credit markets are tight. We use changes in bank lending standards, as reported by the Federal Reserve Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS) and which is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, to identify changes in banks' lending standards (e.g., Bassett et al., 2012) . We assign the destination firm to the weak access to credit category when lending standards are tightening in the quarter of the loan's origination, and to the strong access to credit category otherwise.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results from the estimation of Model 2 for subsamples based on the destination firm's number of lead arrangers. We find that the coefficient on Executive
Turnover is only significant in the weak access to credit subsample. Also, the coefficient is significantly larger for destination firms with weak access relative to destination firms that have better access to credit (the difference in coefficients between the weak and strong access to credit partitions is significant at the 1 percent level). These findings suggest that a lead arranger's comigration with the manager likely alleviates the destination firm's credit constraints.
The results reported in Panel B further support these inferences. We find that the coefficient on Executive Turnover is significant and positive only in periods of tight credit supply. Further, the probability of a lead arranger starting a lending relationship with the destination firm is significantly higher in periods of tight credit supply, compared to periods in which the credit supply is relatively loose (the difference in coefficients between the weak and strong access to credit partitions is significant at the 1 percent level). Thus, the destination firm benefits from access to capital through the manager's lending relationships when credit is tight and firms in the economy are more likely to face credit constraints. Overall, the evidence presented in Table 5 is also consistent with the relationship lending literature that demonstrates that the benefits of relationship lending are particularly important when a borrower has limited access to debt capital (e.g., Rajan, 1992 , Petersen and Rajan, 1994 or during periods when bank credit is relatively scarce (e.g., Bolton et al., 2013) .
Co-migration and the extent and pricing of syndicated lending
In this section, to supplement our findings of lender-manager co-migration when the destination firm is in need of debt capital, we more directly investigate the benefits of lenders' comigration to the destination firm by focusing on the extent of the destination firm's loan financing.
For the sample of firms that experienced executive turnover, we examine whether the destination firm's syndicated loan borrowing is more extensive when the lender co-migrates with the executive relative to other destination firms where the lender does not co-migrate. We estimate the following model using ordinary least square regressions:
Amount is the destination firm's syndicated loan borrowing, estimated as the average of the annual syndication loan issuance divided by total assets over the first three years following the executive's turnover. Untabulated analysis indicates that the destination firms rely heavily on syndicated lending. On average, these firms' syndicated borrowing represents 34% of their long-term assets.
Migrate is defined as in previous analyses. A positive coefficient on Migrate will be consistent with our expectation that destination firms have greater access to debt capital when the lead arranger with an established relationship with the new manager co-migrates. We control for a number of variables that are likely to be related to a destination firm's financing needs. We capture firm growth opportunities by the market-to-book ratio (Destination Firm Market-to-Book) , measured as the sum of market value of equity and total debt divided by the book value of assets.
We also include growth in the destination firm's sales relative to the prior year (Destination Firm Sales Growth) as another growth measure. Destination Firm Size, Destination Firm Profitability and Destination Firm Leverage are defined as in previous analyses. All firm level characteristics are measured in the year prior to the executive's turnover.
We report the results of these tests in Panel A of Table 6 . Consistent with our expectation, we find a positive and significant (at the 10 percent level) effect of a lender's co-migration on the destination firm's syndicated loan borrowing. The coefficient of 0.176 on the Migrate variable suggests that lender co-migration results in an 18 percent higher syndicated loan borrowing for destination firms relative to destination firms that do not experience lender co-migration. This evidence of higher syndicated loan borrowing for destination firms when lead arrangers follow the manager complements our findings in Table 5 that lead arrangers are more likely to co-migrate when the destination firm is in need of relatively more debt capital.
We further extend the benefits of our co-migration analyses by exploring whether comigration is also associated with less expensive credit. As we discuss in Section 2, while lenders may pass on some of the potential cost savings associated with lender-manager relationships to the destination firm, the prior relationship lending literature provides mixed evidence with respect to whether relationship lending decreases the cost of borrowing (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000 , Schenone, 2010 , Bharath et al., 2011 . We employ Model 4 above to examine whether loan pricing is associated with lender-manager co-migration, with
Spread as the dependent variable. Spread is the average interest rate spread on all syndicated loans issued by the destination firm over the three-year period following the executive's turnover. Note that we focus on the average interest spread on all syndicated loans instead of the interest spread on loans issued by the migrating banks only. Availability of credit from the migrating bank and potentially more favorable pricing terms that it offers are likely to put competitive pressure on the pricing of loans provided by other lenders (e.g., Bushman et al., 2015) , thus making the average loan pricing comparison more appropriate. Because loan pricing analyses focus on a sample of treatment firms that experience executive turnover, this approach also allows us to assess the effect of co-migration on loan pricing by comparing the cost of syndicated loan financing for firms where the lender co-migrates with the manager to the cost of syndicated loan financing for firms that do not experience co-migration. Lastly, we augment the model with the Amount variable to control for the extent of syndicated lending.
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. We find that the coefficient on
Migrate is negative and significant (at the 10 percent level). This suggests that destination firms' cost of borrowing is, on average, 21.7 basis points lower when lenders co-migrate with the managers. Economically, this effect represents 11.8 percent of the average interest spread for the sample destination firms. The coefficients on the control variables are also consistent with expectations: larger and more profitable firms as well as firms with higher growth options experience lower interest spreads, while firms with higher leverage and a higher extent of syndicated lending pay higher spreads. Overall, interest spread analyses further support our inference that lender co-migration brings important benefits to the destination firm.
The Strength of Lender-Manager Relationship and Co-Migration
Our analyses so far have focused primarily on the characteristics and financing needs of the destination firm. In this section, we shed light on what affects a lender's decision to co-migrate with a manager. We predict that a stronger lender-manager relationship reduces information asymmetry about the destination firm to a greater extent and thus is associated with a higher probability of lenders' co-migration. To investigate this prediction, we introduce a new methodology where our level of observation is the lender and we consider each of the lead arrangers that syndicated loans to the origin firm over the manager's tenure in this analysis. The sample comprises only those observations where Executive Turnover is equal to 1 (i.e., our treatment sample from the analyses above where the manager moves from the origin firm to the destination firm). We estimate the following lender level logistic regression:
Migrant is an indicator variable that equals one if the lead arranger migrates from the origin to the destination firm, zero otherwise. We find that ten percent of the lead arrangers of the origin firms follow the executive to the destination firm (untabulated). Primary Lender is our main variable of interest and it reflects the strength of the lender-manager relationship. It is an indicator variable that equals one if the lead arranger syndicated more than 75 percent of all loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure, zero otherwise. We predict a positive coefficient on this variable.
We control for a number of variables that may affect the lead arranger's likelihood of comigration. Banks Lending to Destination Firm is defined as in previous tests. A higher number of lead arrangers with relationships with the destination firm is likely to increase the competition for its loans (e.g., Rajan, 1992) , reducing the probability of co-migration. Lending to Origin Firm reflects the importance of the origin firm's business to the lead arranger. It is defined as the ratio of the number of the lead arranger's syndicated loan deals to the origin firm divided by the total number of deals syndicated by the lead arranger, estimated over the three-year period prior to the executive turnover. The higher importance of the origin firm for the lead arranger's syndication activity may reduce its probability of co-migrating with the manager. We also control for a number of the lead arranger's additional characteristics that may affect its likelihood of initiating a new lending relationship. In particular, we control for the lead arranger's size (Lender Size), measured as the natural logarithm of its total assets, its profitability (Lender Profitability), measured as the ratio of the lender's net income to shareholder equity, and capital ratio (Lender Capital), measured as shareholder's equity divided by total assets. These variables are estimated in the year preceding the manager's turnover. Finally, we add a control for the lead arranger's loan growth (Lender Loan Growth), measured as the annual percentage change in the lender's loan portfolio as of the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's move to the destination firm.
We present our findings in Table 7 . Consistent with our prediction about the importance of the strength of the lender-manager relationship, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the Primary Lender variable. Economically, the coefficient on Primary Lender indicates that primary lead arrangers are 3.4 times more likely to co-migrate with the manager relative to the origin firm's other lead arrangers. In terms of control variables, a negative coefficient on Banks
Lending to Destination Firm is consistent with competition over the destination firm's loans decreasing the probability of co-migration. We also find that larger and more profitable lead arrangers are more likely to co-migrate, potentially due to their stronger financial position, which allows them to extend lending.
In the last set of analyses, we examine whether the strength of the lender-manager relationship has a more significant effect on the probability of co-migration when lenders are under pressure to expand their loan portfolio and seek new borrowers. In Panel A of Table 8 , we present the results of estimating Model 5 for the subsamples of low and high loan growth, based on the sample median value of the Lender Loan Growth variable. We find that although the coefficient on Primary Lender is significant for both subsamples, it is significantly higher for the low loan growth lenders (the difference in coefficients across the low and high growth subsamples is significant at the five percent level). This finding supports our prediction that relatively low loan growth induces lead arrangers that have strong relationships with executives to expand their lending portfolio by extending credit to destination firms.
The analyses based on the lender's profitability-based classification are presented in Panel B. We assign lenders to the low versus high profitability partition based on the sample median value of Lender Profitability. The coefficient on Primary Lender is positive and significant only in the low profitability partition, with the difference in the coefficients on this variable being significantly different at the one percent level between the two partitions. This finding suggests that low profitability incentivizes primary lead arrangers to follow managers to destination firms, as this new lending relationship may increase their future profitability via additional interest revenues, loan origination fees or fees from other services provided to the destination firm.
Conclusion
An extensive literature examines the nature and consequences of relationship lending. The majority of prior studies focus on the relationship at the institutional level between lenders and the borrowing firm (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000 , Bharath et al., 2011 , and Schenone, 2010 . Because managers significantly affect a firm's corporate policies, strategies and performance, in this study we pose the question of whether lenders develop relationships not only with a borrowing firm, but also with its managers, and examine how these lender-manager relationships affect private lending. We posit that lenders' relationships with managers reduce information asymmetry about the borrowing firm's creditworthiness and future performance and thus significantly affect lending practices.
Consistent with this prediction, using a setting of executive turnovers to identify lender-manager relationships, we find that a lender is 1.6 times more likely to commence a lending relationship with a firm when a manager with whom it has a prior relationship joins the firm as a top executive. Lenders' relationships with managers are particularly valuable when borrowers are informationally opaque -the likelihood of lenders co-migrating is significantly higher when the destination firm is smaller, not rated by a credit rating agency or when it has low analyst following.
Further, co-migration benefits destination firms by providing them with greater access to credit and at lower costs. We find that lenders are more likely to follow managers when the firms they join have weaker access to debt capital. We also show that lenders' co-migration is associated with an 18 percent higher syndicated loan borrowing for destination firms following executive turnover relative to destination firms that do not experience lender co-migration. On average, the destination firms' cost of borrowing is 21.7 basis points lower when lenders co-migrate with managers. With respect to the factors that affects lenders' decision to co-migrate, we find that co-migration is more likely when lenders have a stronger prior relationship with the manager. Finally, the strength of the lender-manager relationship has a significantly stronger influence on the decision to co-migrate when lenders are under pressure to expand their loan portfolios and are seeking new clients.
We contribute to the relationship lending literature by highlighting the importance of the relationship between lenders and managers. We also show that this relationship significantly benefits borrowers via enhanced access to credit and a lower cost of debt financing. We extend the developing literature on the role of personal relationships in capital markets. Our findings suggest that the lender-manager relationship carries over to the new firm that hires the manager as a top executive. We further contribute to the literature that examines how personal networks and relationships affect business and investment decisions. We show that lenders' relationship with a manager incentivizes lenders to initiate a lending relationship with the firm that the manager joins.
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Amount Banks Lending to Origin Firm
The destination firm's syndicated loan borrowing, estimated as the average of the annual syndication loan issuance divided by total assets over the first three years following the executive's turnover (DealScan and Compustat).
The number of lead arrangers that syndicated loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure (DealScan).
Banks Lending to Destination Firm
The number of lead arrangers that syndicated loans to the destination firm during the three years prior to the executive's appointment (DealScan).
Bank Overlap
An indicator variable equal to one if at least one lead arranger lending to the origin firm during the executive's tenure also syndicated loans to the destination firm during the three years prior to the executive's appointment at the destination firm, zero otherwise (DealScan).
Destination Firm Leverage Destination Firm Market-to-Book Destination Firm Profitability Destination Firm Sales Growth Destination Firm Size
The ratio of the destination firm's long-term debt to total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
The sum of the destination firm's market value of equity and total debt divided by the book value of assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
The ratio of the destination firm's net income before extraordinary items to total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
The destination firm's sales growth relative to the prior year, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
A natural logarithm of the destination firm's total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat). Lead arranger's shareholder equity divided by total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Bank Compustat).
The annual percentage change in the size of the lead arranger's loan portfolio, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Bank Compustat).
The ratio of a lead arranger's net income to shareholders' equity (Bank Compustat), measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Bank Compustat).
The natural logarithm of the lead arranger's total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Bank Compustat).
The ratio of the number of syndicated loan deals of the lead arranger to the origin firm divided by the total number of deals syndicated by the lead arranger, estimated over the three-year period prior to the executives' turnover (DealScan).
The difference between Destination Firm Leverage and Origin Firm Leverage.
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the lead arranger migrates with the manager to the destination firm, zero otherwise (DealScan).
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one lead arranger that syndicated loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure starts syndicating loans to the destination firm within three years of the executive's appointment, zero otherwise. We consider the lead arranger as starting the relationship with the destination firms if it had not arranged its syndicated loans over the three-year period prior to the executive turnover (DealScan).
The ratio of the origin firm's long-term debt to total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal
Origin Firm Profitability
Origin Firm Size year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
The ratio of the origin firm's net income before extraordinary items to total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
A natural logarithm of the origin firm's total assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year preceding the executive's turnover (Compustat).
Primary Lender Profitability Difference Same Industry
Size Difference
Spread
An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the lead arranger syndicated more than 75 percent of all loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure, zero otherwise (DealScan).
The difference between Destination Firm Profitability and Origin Firm Profitability.
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the origin and destination firms are in the same four-digit SIC group, and 0 otherwise (Compustat).
The difference between Destination Firm Size and Origin Firm Size.
An average interest rate spread on all syndicated loans issued by the destination firm over the three-year period following the executive's turnover (DealScan).
Turnover
For
Step 1 of the matching procedure, an indicator variable that takes the value of one when the executive's origin firm is paired with its actual destination firm, zero otherwise. For
Step 2 of the matching procedure, an indicator variable that takes the value of one when the executive's destination firm is paired with its actual origin firm, zero otherwise (Execucomp and Boardex). Step 1 X= every pseudo destination firm that has the same 2-digit SIC code as destination firm B. b = the pseudo destination firm that has the closest propensity score to the actual destination firm.
Step 2
X=every pseudo origin firm that has the same 2-digit SIC code as origin firm A. a= the pseudo origin firm that has the closest propensity score to the actual origin firm.
Step 3 This table presents the analyses of the effect of the executive turnover on the probability that at least one of the lead arrangers of the origin firm initiates a lending relationship with the destination firm, conditional on the destination firm's information opacity. Panel A presents the analyses based on a destination firm's size, Panel B presents the analyses based on whether a borrower is rated by a credit rating agency and Panel C presents the analyses based on the extent of the destination firm's analyst coverage. The dependent variable is Migrate, which takes the value of one if at least one lead arranger that syndicated loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure starts syndicating loans to the destination firm within three years of the executive's appointment, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference across destination firm size, rating status or analyst coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. This table presents the analyses of the effects of the executive turnover on the probability that at least one of the lead arrangers of the origin firm initiates a lending relationship with the destination firm, conditional on the destination firm's access to debt capital. In Panel A, we measure a destination firm's access to credit based on the number of lead arrangers that syndicated its loans over the three-year period prior to the executive's turnover. In Panel B, we measure access to credit based on the tightness of the lending standards in credit markets in the quarter of a loan's origination. The dependent variable is Migrate, which takes the value of one if at least one lead arranger that syndicated loans to the origin firm during the executive's tenure starts syndicating loans to the destination firm within three years of the executive's appointment, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference across access to credit partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. This table presents the analyses of the effect of lenders' co-migration with the manager on the syndicated lending amount (Panel A) and its pricing (Panel B). In Panel A, the dependent variable is Amount, which is the destination firm's syndicated loan borrowing, estimated as the average of the annual syndication loan issuance divided by total assets over the first three years following the executive's appointment. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Spread, estimated as the average interest rate spread on all syndicated loans issued by the destination firm over the three-year period following the executive's turnover. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
